The development of a person-centred care practice is inextricably linked with the debate about being a person and personhood. This debate takes on a particular relevance when certain prerequisites, which are often used as defining characteristics, can no longer be fulfilled by our counterparts. This is the case, for example, with intensive care patients who are often (temporarily) impaired in their responsiveness and consciousness due to their critical state of health. Due to sedation, severity of illness and loss of voice, delivery of person-centred care in the intensive care setting is described as challenging (Cederwall et al. 2018). Despite far reaching implications on the therapeutic, ethical, and legal handling of this patient clientele, a definition of personhood at the stage of briefly diminished (by anesthetic measures), limited, or absent consciousness and ability to communicate has so far been discussed only superficially. In order to meet this challenge and to develop an understanding of person-centred practice suitable for the context of intensive care, Emmanuel Levinas' relational ethics and his understanding of radical alterity will be discussed. We uncover the implications of Levinas Ethics of Radical Alterity on the care for the unconscious and unresponsive patient in the ICU setting and further on the person-centred approach to practice. This provides an opportunity for the ontological embedding of the person-centred care approach, which makes it possible to meet and care for these patients in a person-centred manner.